The two examples of someone making moral decisions were both about someone deciding if they could live with something they were going to do. I hold this is the prototype of a moral decision. A moral decision differs from a legal, tactical, logistical, business, medical, artistic or any other kind not because of its content, but because we remain responsible for its foreseeable consequences no matter what reasons we had for making it. Nothing and nobody can remove this responsibility, neither God, nor the High Command nor the Categorical Imperative, the teachings of our prophet nor the advice of our lawyers. Moral decisions are taken by ourselves alone. We cannot lay off our responsibility on our culture, God or principles, because it is for us to decide to act according to those principles, that culture or God. It is our decision how we decide how to decide.
And this is the relevant characteristic of an adult: someone who accepts their responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of their decisions, their responsibility for choosing how to decide, and for the decision itself. (Deciding how to decide how to decide is equivalent to deciding how to decide, so the regress stops at two paces.) The question "what should I do" invites an answer from an authority, from Emily Post to Halsbury Laws of England, or perhaps guidance from a guru, from Aristotle to L Ron Hubbard, but while the authority can rule, and the guru can suggest, neither removes the responsibility from you. The question "can I live with this?" puts the responsibility where it lies - though it is worth noting that the answer "I can live with it, but that doesn't mean I'm going to do it" is perfectly consistent.
If we accept that morality is about what we should do, we set off in the wrong direction from the first step. It has us arguing about the merits of one authority over another, and the tenability and interpretation of general principles: arguments that have been going nowhere since the Egyptians built the Pyramids. Given two people of equal sincerity, intelligence and good intentions, if they hold inconsistent principles (or inconsistent interpretations of the same principle) then agreement is out of reach. If we accept that morality is about what we can live with, what we can do in good conscience, then we recognise that the discussion is there to persuade, influence, inform, and maybe even convince, the us, the decision-maker. In most circumstances, to call an argument "ad hominem" is dismissive, but part of what makes morality special is that its arguments are properly ad hominem. They are properly directed at the concerns, interests, beliefs, situation and interests of the decision-maker.
Two quick technicalities. First, moral responsibility is not legal responsibility. It's up to the legislature, influenced by whatever theories of the mind they may hear, to decide when a person should not be held to account for the foreseeable consequences of their actions - the scope and limits of legal irresponsibility is itself a moral decision. Moral responsibility applies to anyone capable of acting, because even if we do not use the law to punish someone for an action, we may still decide to exclude them from our daily lives, and that is moral censure as much as it may be prudential good sense.
Second, foreseeable consequences are those that a reasonable person would predict. I know no tax law, but my decision not to pay my dues taxes is unreasonable because I lacked the information I needed (the size of the fine for non-payment) to make it. Being late for a meeting because the train was cancelled is not foreseeable (at least if the weather is clement) because we cannot reasonably work in a world where we can't assume that railway companies might arbitrarily cancel trains. However, my powers of reasonable prediction end when another person has to decide how to respond. The actions of other people in response to our actions are not foreseeable. If I throw a punch in your direction, the blood from your nose is foreseeable, but your reaction is not. You might do many things as a result of many different calculations and reactions. One day you might fight back, and another not. However, some of your responses will be entirely reasonable and in common speech I "shouldn't be surprised" or I "can't complain" if you do them: others will be unreasonable. I can't complain if you take a swing back at me, but I can if you pull out a knife. Such actions are considered possible responses by a reasonable person, but which if any will happen is not reasonably predictable.
Adults make moral decisions by asking what they can live with. How do we best influence them? Treat the problem as a practical one. What would change their minds? What facts would make a decision easy? What are the pulls-and pushes in their decision, what are the trade-offs? Are there any principles they really won't compromise? (For me, it doesn't matter what you threaten me with, I'm going to take an alcoholic drink.) What are their concerns? What actions might mitigate those concerns? Is there a way of doing whatever it is that is acceptable, and are there unacceptable ways? Can they live with it if amends are made for the harms and losses the action might cause? Or is it simply a question of steeling themselves to do it, of overcoming some squeamishness and of accepting the full scope of the responsibility their role places on them? And if so, how do we help them do so? (What we do not do is preach, harangue, threaten, insult, charm, bribe, distract, sweet-talk, promise, or use tricks like reflective listening. Because that's not how you treat equals and colleagues. It's how you treat children. And if you want an adult to punish you for your insult and presumption, treat them as a child. You will deserve everything you get.)
In the next post I will look at the consequences of this position for traditional moral philosophy.
No comments:
Post a Comment