Wednesday 28 December 2011

The Epistemological Problems of Privacy: (1) The Conference Outline

I ran across the prospectus for a conference on the "Epistemological Problems of Privacy" to be held in June 2012 in Delft. Here are the "potential topics and themes". Read it carefully.

(begins)
Below follows a non-exhaustive list of topics and themes that might be addressed by the papers in the open sessions. Note that, even though the issue of privacy borders on several fiels of philosopy (such as epistemology, ethics and political philosophy), we have a decided preference for orientations that are heavily epistemological.

1. Privacy and the value of knowledge
A central thought in epistemology is that knowledge is distinctively valuable and that our social practices should therefore promote it. If that is true, however, how should we explain that with respect to private matters knowledge of these private matters doesn’t seem distinctively valuable at all and that knowledge seems to be even less valuable than true belief?

2. Privacy and the value of ignorance
Epistemology focuses on knowledge and tries to explain what its value is. Privacy suggests that there might also be a value to ignorance. What could the epistemic value of ignorance be?

3. Knowledge and secrecy
In contexts of the accessibility and transparency of information on the Internet one sometimes hears slogans like ‘Knowledge wants to be free’ (Compare, for instance, Wiki-leak activities). But what is meant by this? Should this be taken as a universal maxim that governs social-political policies? This would impact not only on issues of privacy but also on issues of secrecy. If there is a right to protect privacy, might there also be an argument to protect secrets?

4. Privacy and contexts of epistemic appraisal
Privacy seems to have a contextual element. In some contexts, one might want to protect one’s privacy, but in other contexts one might consent to opening up one’s privacy. This might, for instance, depend on the stakes the subject faces in a given context. How should we think of the relation between this kind of contextuality and the debate about the contextuality of knowledge, where the stakes are sometimes thought to play a role in evaluating the truth-value of a knowledge ascription?

5. Privacy and assertion
According to the knowledge account of assertion, one should assert that P only if one knows that P. Assertions of P can invade on someone’s privacy. Should norms for assertion be specified that accommodate this idea?

6. Knowing-who and personal data
The notion of ‘personal data’ is central in the privacy debate. But what exactly personal data are remains unclear. Can epistemology shed some light on this issue by, for instance, establishing a connection between knowing-who and personal data?

7. Privacy and epistemic justice
Knowledge is central to privacy. Privacy violations seem to be a form of injustice. If one’s privacy has been violated, has an epistemic injustice been done to the person whose privacy has been violated?

8. Privacy and trust
‘Trust’ is a central theme in contemporary epistemology. How do concerns about one’s privacy interact with the notion of trust?
(ends)

Okay. Now you can scream. If you don't know why you should scream, read the next post.

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